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FOR THE GANDER: SARBANES-OXLEY-STYLE 
NONPROFIT REFORMS 
Lumen N. Mulligan* 
In this Article, I contend that the Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired nonprofit re-
forms currently being put forward in seven states, particularly the costly 
disclosure requirements, will be of little value in the effort to improve ethi-
cal nonprofit board governance. After providing a primer on the oversight 
of nonprofit organizations and highlighting the unique difficulties facing 
the nonprofit sector, the Article reviews the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like 
nonprofit reforms introduced in seven states. It then contends that the dis-
closure-focused reforms that form the bulwark of these initiatives will not 
foster improved ethical nonprofit board governance. It also argues that this 
failure stems from the inappropriate application of a stockholder-based 
normative perspective in the nonprofit sector. The Article concludes by  
noting that appropriating a normative construct more tailored to the non-
profit community, namely stakeholder theory, is essential to drafting 
effective nonprofit sector reforms in the future. 
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Introduction 
The United States boasts the largest nonprofit sector in the world, and 
that sector continues to grow.1 The Internal Revenue Service, the primary 
federal regulator of nonprofit organizations,2 currently oversees 1.6 million 
tax-exempt organizations holding $2.4 trillion in assets.3 Unfortunately, this 
huge sector of the economy recently has been pummeled with a spate of 
now all-too-familiar corporate scandals.4 In the seven years preceding 2002, 
officers and directors of major charitable organizations misappropriated at 
least $1.28 billion from 152 nonprofit organizations.5 To make matters 
worse, a recent Chronicle of Philanthropy study contends that this figure, 
which is based upon newspaper reports, significantly underestimates the 
scope of abuses within the nonprofit community.6 Congress responded to 
similar misdeeds in the for-profit sector with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which 
imposes, inter alia, a series of disclosure, corporate governance, and audit-
ing requirements upon enumerated, publicly traded corporations.7 But, with 
the notable exceptions of the whistleblower and document-retention provi-
sions, Sarbanes-Oxley does not apply to nonprofit corporations.8  
                                                                                                                      
 1. Stephanie Strom, Accountability; New Equation for Charities: More Money, Less Over-
sight, N.Y. Times, Nov. 17 2003, at F1. 
 2. See Marion R. Fremont-Smith, Governing Nonprofit Organizations: Federal 
and State Law and Regulation 238–41 (2004). 
 3. See Internal Revenue Service, Tax Exempt & Government Entities Division At-a-Glance, 
http://www.irs.gov/irs/article/0,,id=100971,00.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (providing listing of 
services for exempt organizations). 
 4. See, e.g., James J. Fishman, Improving Charitable Accountability, 62 Md. L. Rev. 218, 
219 n.1 (2003) (providing examples of recent scandals involving nonprofit organizations). 
 5. Brad Wolverton, Study: Charity Fraud Exceeds $1-Billion, Chron. Philanthropy, 
Nov. 27, 2003, at 26. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered 
sections of 11, 15, 18, 28 and 29 U.S.C. (Supp. III 2003)). 
 8. Sarbanes-Oxley, as a general rule, regulates the SEC, issuers of securities that register 
with the SEC, and professionals (e.g., lawyers and accountants) who work with securities issuers. 
See generally id. § 203 (regulating accountants); id. § 301 (regulating issuers of securities); id. § 307 
(regulating attorneys). Nonprofit corporations, by contrast, are subject to a “nondistribution con-
straint,” meaning they may not pay out net profits to shareholders or the like. See, e.g., Revised 
Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 13.01, 1.40 (1987); Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit 
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 838 (1980) (providing the definitive discussion of the “nondistribu-
tion constraint”). As such, they cannot issue securities and do not generally fall under the scope of 
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Nevertheless, the recent incidents of nonprofit malfeasance have not es-
caped state legislative notice. This attention has spawned a host of Sarbanes-
Oxley-like proposals for nonprofit organizations, which are the focus of this 
Article. Immediately following the passage of Sarbanes-Oxley, the New 
York Legislature led the way by taking up a wide-ranging bill, championed 
by the state attorney general, that would mandate Sarbanes-Oxley-like re-
forms for the nonprofit sector.9 The Massachusetts attorney general soon 
proposed his own bill similar to New York’s.10 Neither bill passed. Numer-
ous other states have followed suit by introducing comparable Sarbanes-
Oxley-like bills that ultimately failed to pass.11 Several states, however, have 
passed acts codifying some Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms for nonprofit or-
ganizations—California’s Nonprofit Integrity Act of 2004 being, perhaps, 
the most well-known.12 The unifying theme of these Sarbanes-Oxley-
inspired bills is their reliance upon disclosure mechanisms (e.g., officer-
certified financial statements), governance mandates (e.g., audit commit-
tees), and auditing requirements (e.g., independent audits performed by 
CPAs) to induce corporate integrity.13  
In this Article, I contend that these state reforms, particularly the costly 
disclosure requirements, will be of little value in the effort to improve non-
profit governance.14 The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a primer 
on the oversight of nonprofit organizations. Part II reviews the recent Sar-
banes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms introduced in seven states. Part III 
                                                                                                                      
Sarbanes-Oxley. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure Com-
prehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 205, 244 (2004). 
 9. See S.B. 4836-A, 2003 Leg., 226th Gen. Sess. (N.Y. 2003). This bill was substantially 
amended. S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2003). The legislature has yet to pass this bill. 
See Dana Brakman Reiser, There Ought To Be A Law: The Disclosure Focus Of Recent Legislative 
Proposals For Nonprofit Reform, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 559, 562–64 (2005) (outlining the legisla-
tive history of the New York bill); Brackman Reiser, supra note 8, at 244–48 (same). 
 10. Office of the Massachusetts Attorney General Tom Reilly, An Act to Promote the Finan-
cial Integrity of Public Charities, http://www.ago.state.ma.us/filelibrary/FinancialIntegrityPublic 
Charities.rtf (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) [hereinafter Mass. A.G. Proposal]. 
 11. See, e.g., S.B. 1115, 92d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2004); H.B. 514, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Miss. 2004); H.B. 724, Adjourned Sess. Of 2003–2004 Biennium (Vt. 2004); S.B. 153, 125th Gen. 
Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2003); H.B. 1019, 187th Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2003). The U.S. 
Senate, spearheaded by Senator Grassley, has also considered Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legisla-
tion, which is beyond the scope of this Article. See CARE Act of 2003, S.B. 476, 108th Cong. 
(2003); see also Panel on the Nonprofit Sector, Strengthening Transparency Govern-
ance Accountability of Charitable Organizations: A Final Report to Congress and the 
Nonprofit Sector (2005), http://www.nonprofitpanel.org/final/Panel_Final_Report.pdf (providing 
a sweeping series of federal reforms upon request of the Senate Finance Committee). 
 12. See, e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17510.5 (West Supp. 2006); Cal. Gov’t. Code 
§§ 12581–12599.7; Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 21a–190b, c, f, h (West Supp. 2006); Kan. Stat. 
Ann. § 17-1763, 17-6002 (Supp. 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 5004 (Supp. 2005); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:28III-a to -b (Supp. 2005); W. Va. Code Ann. § 12-4-14 (LexisNexis 2004) 
(applying only to recipients of state grants). 
 13. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 562–66, 568, 573; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 
208–09, 268. 
 14. This Article will limit its scope to issues of board governance. The exclusion of issues 
directly involving nonprofit managers is a function of limited space in this symposium edition, not a 
perceived lack of importance of managers. 
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contends that the disclosure-focused reforms, which form the bulwark of 
these bills, will not foster ethical nonprofit board governance. Part IV argues 
that this failure stems from the inappropriate application of a stockholder-
based normative perspective in the nonprofit sector. The Article concludes 
by noting that appropriating a normative construct more tailored to the non-
profit community, namely stakeholder theory, is essential to drafting 
effective nonprofit sector reforms in the future. 
I. Primer on Nonprofit Corporate Oversight 
The nonprofit corporation, with 501(c)(3) public charity tax-exempt 
status, is the predominant organizational form for nonprofit organizations.15 
These organizations constitute the focus of this Article. The recently intro-
duced, state-based, Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms that attempt to affect the 
governance of these nonprofit corporations are best understood against the 
backdrop of the current state of nonprofit board governance and regulation. 
While many of these features will be familiar to lawyers who work in the 
for-profit corporate sector, there are numerous factors unique to the non-
profit sector that significantly affect nonprofit board governance and the 
regulation of nonprofits by third parties and governmental authorities. 
A. Board of Directors Oversight of Nonprofit Corporations 
The legal principles that frame for-profit board governance generally 
apply to nonprofit corporations.16 As with for-profit corporations, nonprofit 
corporations are governed by a board of directors.17 As with for-profit corpo-
rations, the board must monitor management, make decisions regarding the 
high-level direction of the organization, and approve its major transactions.18 
Again, like for-profit directors, nonprofit directors are subject to the fiduci-
ary duties of loyalty and care, which are applied by the courts with the same 
rigor (or lack thereof) as is done in the for-profit context.19  
                                                                                                                      
 15. Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 116 (explaining that in the United States today the 
nonprofit corporation is the main form of charitable organization). Of the 1.6 million IRS-registered 
tax-exempt organizations, 1.05 million are organized as 501(c)(3) organizations, which includes 
both public charities and private foundations (the overwhelming majority of whom are public chari-
ties). See Giving USA Found., Giving USA 2006: The Annual Report on Philanthropy for 
the Year 2005, at 55. 
 16. See, e.g., Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2002) (“[P]rinciples of law governing for profit corporations generally govern the 
activities of a nonprofit corporation . . . .”); James J. Fishman & Stephen Schwarz, Nonprofit 
Organizations 63 (2d ed. 2000). 
 17. See, e.g., Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.01 (1987) (requiring a board of 
directors and listing its powers, duties, standards of conduct, etc.). 
 18. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Dismembering Civil Society: The Social Cost of Internally 
Undemocratic Nonprofits, 82 Or. L. Rev. 829, 835 (2003). 
 19. See Fishman, supra note 4, at 232–39; Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of 
Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 J. Corp. L. 631, 
644 (1998); see also Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.30; Denise Ping Lee, Note, The 
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Nonprofit directors have a unique legal fiduciary duty as well. Specifi-
cally, nonprofit directors have a duty of obedience to the mission of the 
nonprofit organization.20 As one court put it, “nonprofit directors . . . must be 
‘principally concerned about the effective performance of the nonprofit’s 
mission.’ ”21 In addition to this duty of obedience to the mission, several 
other key features of nonprofit corporations differentiate them from their 
for-profit cousins and significantly affect nonprofit board governance.  
First, and most important, nonprofit organizations are subject to a non-
distributional constraint. That is to say, nonprofit organizations may earn net 
profits, but they may not distribute these profits to persons who exercise 
control over the organization (i.e. directors, officers, employees, and other 
members of the organization).22 This nondistributional constraint has wide-
ranging implications for board governance, not the least of which is the lack 
of a commonly accepted metric of performance.23 Because nonprofit organi-
zations lack the sort of financial indicators that provide a measure of success 
in the for-profit context, nonprofit directors often face considerable diffi-
culty evaluating the performance of their own organizations.24 Further, this 
inability to distribute profits stymies the creation of market-based regulatory 
regimes like those found in the for-profit sector.25  
                                                                                                                      
Business Judgment Rule: Should it Protect Nonprofit Directors?, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 925, 935–45 
(2003) (outlining the application of the business judgment rule for nonprofit directors). 
 20. Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 16, at 230–32; Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 837.  
 21. Summers, 112 S.W.3d at 504 (quoting Harvey J. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of 
Nonprofit Directors and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23 Iowa J. Corp. L. 
631, 641 (1998)); see also Queen of Angels Hosp. v. Younger, 66 Cal. App. 3d 359,365 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1977); Brown v. Mem’l Nat’l Home Found., 329 P.2d 118, 122 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); Att’y 
Gen. v. Hahnemann Hosp., 494 N.E.2d 1011, 1018 (Mass. 1986); Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat 
Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 595 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999) (“[T]he duty of obedience . . . man-
dates that a [nonprofit] Board, in the first instance, seek to preserve its original mission.”). 
 22. See generally Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act §§ 13.01, 1.40(10) (prohibiting 
distribution of net profits to insiders); Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 833–34 (discussing the 
nondistributional constraint); Hansmann, supra note 8, at 838 (providing the definitive discussion of 
this concept). 
 23. See, e.g., Judith L. Miller, The Board as a Monitor of Organizational Activity: The Appli-
cability of Agency Theory to Nonprofit Boards, 12 Nonprofit Mgmt. & Leadership 429, 433 
(2002); Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does The Structure And Composition Of The Board 
Matter? The Case Of Nonprofit Organizations, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 205, 206 (2005). Of course, 
financial performance is not the sole measure of for-profit performance either. See, e.g., John 
Elkington, Cannibals with Forks: The Triple Bottom Line of 21st Century Business 
(1998) (introducing the notion of a “triple bottom line” by which corporate performance is governed 
by its environmental and social impacts in addition to its financial success). But see Wayne Norman 
& Chris MacDonald, Getting to the Bottom of “Triple Bottom Line,” 14 Bus. Ethics Q. 243 (2004) 
(critiquing the triple bottom line concept). 
 24. See generally Richard P. Chait et al., Improving the Performance of Governing 
Boards (1996) (finding that university board members had difficulty evaluating the success of their 
schools in achieving their missions). 
 25. See generally Geoffrey A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitable Or-
ganizations, 1999 Wis. L. Rev. 227 (describing this problem and proposing the “artificial” creation 
of a market to regulate nonprofit organizations which would be required by founders of nonprofits 
and large donor organizations). 
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Second, while it is possible for nonprofit corporations to have members 
with voting rights—persons who would hold similar rights and duties as 
shareholders in a for-profit corporation—the overwhelming majority of 
nonprofit corporations do not have voting members.26 As a result, most non-
profit boards are self-perpetuating—new members of the board are 
appointed by the board itself.27 This affects board governance in several di-
mensions. Most dramatically, the lack of voting members significantly 
contributes to an accountability vacuum that plagues nonprofit boards.28 A 
recent study by Professor Judith L. Miller, for instance, found that nonprofit 
board members had difficulty identifying any group to whom they were ac-
countable.29 This lack of accountability to shareholders (or anyone else) 
leads nonprofit boards to explain their conduct to a broad range of constitu-
ents who often have competing agendas (e.g., donors, governmental 
authorities, clients, and staff).30 These competing constituencies often push 
nonprofit corporations to seek differing goals. As nonprofit corporations 
accommodate these constituencies, articulating and striving toward a coher-
ent mission becomes more difficult.31  
Third, the lack of both a clear performance metric and board account-
ability, combined with other factors, has led most nonprofit scholars to note 
that the role of the nonprofit director is more complex than that of for-profit 
board members.32 Yet the task of nonprofit director is predominantly per-
formed by volunteers33 who spend significantly less time at the task than 
their for-profit counterparts.34 Again, this has ramifications for board gov-
                                                                                                                      
 26. Evelyn Brody, Entrance, Voice, and Exit: The Constitutional Bounds of the Right of 
Association, 35 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 821, 860 (2002) (“[T]he typical nonprofit organization is a 
corporation that lacks members with power to vote for the board or on policy issues . . . .”); Manne, 
supra note 25, at 250 (“Charitable nonprofits, however, rarely have members.”). 
 27. Brakman Reiser, supra note 18, at 830 (“Today, self-perpetuating boards are the norm 
and members are rare, particularly among charitable or public benefit nonprofits.”). 
 28. See, e.g., U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, Tax-Exempt Organizations: Improve-
ments Possible in Public, IRS, and State Oversight of Charities (2002); Evelyn Brody, 
Agents Without Principals: The Economic Convergence of the Nonprofit and For-Profit Organiza-
tional Forms, 40 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 457, 465–66 (1996); Mary Frances Budig et al., Pledges to 
Nonprofit Organizations: Are They Enforceable and Must They Be Enforced?, 27 U.S.F. L. Rev. 47, 
108 (1992); Fishman, supra note 4, passim; Miller, supra note 23, at 439–42. 
 29. Miller, supra note 23, at 439–42. 
 30. Id. at 442 (“Nonprofit boards are answerable to multiple constituencies with differing 
expectations . . . .”); O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 206. 
 31. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 205–06. 
 32. See, e.g., id. at 206–07; Goldschmid, supra note 19, at 632; Wendy K. Szymanski, An 
Allegory of Good (and Bad) Governance: Applying the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to Nonprofit Organiza-
tions, 2003 Utah L. Rev. 1303, 1317. 
 33. O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 215; Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316; David W. 
Barrett, Note, A Call for More Lenient Director Liability Standards for Small, Charitable Nonprofit 
Corporations, 71 Ind. L.J. 967, 970 (1996). 
 34. O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 212 (“In this sample, the mean percent of board 
meetings attended was 71%; this is low relative to the corporate setting, in which any director of a 
public company who attends less than 75% of board meetings must be reported in the annual report 
to shareholders. Similarly the estimate by board members of an average of forty-two hours per year 
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ernance. For instance, nonprofit directors typically lack sufficient informa-
tion to make informed decisions.35 This inability to invest directors’ time 
into making informed decisions is exacerbated by the informal, yet ubiqui-
tous, requirement that nonprofit directors do much more than oversee 
managers. “The common folklore is that board members should bring to an 
organization the three W’s: wealth (donations and fundraising), wisdom 
(monitoring and oversight), and work (operational duties), a much broader 
set of responsibilities than with for-profit boards.”36 Due in large part to the 
demands for wealth and work from members of the board, nonprofits tend to 
have larger boards than for-profit corporations, which in turn affects board 
performance as larger nonprofit board size correlates with less formal over-
sight of management.37 
Fourth, given that most nonprofit directors sit on large, volunteer-
dominated boards that lack concrete measures of success or lines of ac-
countability, it should be no surprise that directors rely heavily on staff. 
Miller’s empirical findings corroborate this phenomenon. Nonprofit board 
members, she found, often rely exclusively on staff to provide them with 
information they need to vote on policy initiatives.38 Miller also found that 
nonprofit board members rubberstamp management’s proposals without 
debating the effect those proposals would have on the organization.39 Miller 
further found that even when circumstances appeared to mandate a more 
diligent oversight regime, boards frequently defer to staff and the chief ex-
ecutive officer.40 In a recent study, Professor Edward Glaeser confirmed 
Miller’s findings that nonprofit organizations are often “captured” by their 
staff and tend to evolve towards “worker cooperatives,” especially as the net 
worth of the organization increases.41 Other empirical studies also confirm 
that “[l]arge or small, most voluntary agencies are unusually dependent on 
the quality of their executive leadership, and therefore, more subject to idio-
syncratic rather than structural factors.”42 Furthermore, nonprofit managers 
                                                                                                                      
spent on board activity is low relative to a recent survey suggesting that outside corporate directors 
spend an average of 157 hours per year on board matters.” (citation omitted)). 
 35. Katherine O’Regan & Sharon M. Oster, Does Government Funding Alter Nonprofit 
Governance?, 21 J. Pol’y Analysis & Mgmt. 359, 361 (2002); O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 
215. 
 36. O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 207; see also Miller, supra note 23, at 430 (“These 
behaviors and activities [expected from nonprofit boards] include things such as determining the 
organization’s mission and purpose; selecting, supporting, and evaluating the chief executive; engag-
ing in strategic planning; monitoring programs and services; providing sound financial management; 
advancing the organization’s public image; raising money; and assuring that the organization fulfills 
legal and ethical requirements.” (citation omitted)). 
 37. See O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 206, 216–19. 
 38. Miller, supra note 23, at 438. 
 39. See id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Edward L. Glaeser, Introduction to The Governance of Nonprofit Firms 1–44 (Ed-
ward L. Glaeser ed., 2003). 
 42. R. M. Kramer, Voluntary Agencies and the Personal Social Services, in The Nonprofit 
Sector: A Research Handbook 244 (W.W. Powell ed., 1987). 
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have come to expect this deference. Nonprofit managers tend to favor less 
independent boards and often complain of “meddling” board members.43 In 
short, there are few internal mechanisms that foster independent board con-
trol of nonprofit corporations. 
B. Third-Party Oversight of Nonprofit Corporations 
The non-board-based governance mechanisms for nonprofit corpora-
tions are also notoriously lax.44 As noted above, the nonprofit community 
lacks an efficient, market-based regulatory regime.45 Furthermore, there is 
no existing, effective mechanism for supervision of nonprofits by nongov-
ernmental agencies through the courts. Very few people have standing to sue 
nonprofit organizations.46 In most states, the only nongovernmental entities 
who have standing to sue nonprofits for mismanagement or breaches of fi-
duciary duty are members of the board itself.47 Board members, however, 
face significant disincentives that counsel against exercising this power; 
these disincentives have severely limited the efficacy of this mechanism of 
board supervision.48 Moreover, in most states, donors and recipients, who 
would appear to have incentives to seek redress from the courts, lack stand-
ing to sue.49 Finally, even in those few states that allow broader standing,50 
this mechanism has not been a successful means of regulating nonprofit 
boards.51  
                                                                                                                      
 43. O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 208. 
 44. See Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Chari-
table Fiduciaries?, 23 J. Corp. L. 655, 657 (1998); Fishman, supra note 4, at 268–69; Henry B. 
Hansmann, Reforming Nonprofit Corporation Law, 129 U. Pa. L. Rev. 497, 606–07 (1981); Dana 
Brakman Reiser, Decision-Makers Without Duties, 53 Rutgers L. Rev. 979, 1020–22 (2001). 
 45. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.  
 46. See generally Lee, supra note 19, at 933 (“Unlike business corporations, which provide 
for shareholder derivative suits, standing for suits against nonprofits is extremely limited, and few 
parties are able to sue even if they have legitimate grievances.”). 
 47. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28 U.S.F. L. 
Rev. 37, 40–42 (1993). 
 48. See, e.g., Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting 
Strategic Consolidation Through Law and Public Policy, 74 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1089, 1120 (2001) 
(“Since directors make the organization’s decisions, the chances are slim of a dissident director 
emerging and willing to take on the onerous task of bringing suit against his or her colleagues.”); 
James J. Fishman, The Development of Nonprofit Corporation Law and an Agenda for Reform, 34 
Emory L.J. 617, 669 (1985) (“While directors of charitable corporations generally have standing to 
sue, they rarely bring derivative suits.”).  
 49. See Developments in the Law, Nonprofit Corporations, 105 Harv. L. Rev. 1578, 1596 
(1992) (“[D]onors to charitable corporations have often been denied the right to enforce the direc-
tors’ fiduciary duties.”); Hansmann, supra note 44, at 607. 
 50. See, e.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5142(a) (West 1990) (granting standing to nonprofit offi-
cers); N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 623(a), 720(b) (McKinney 2005) (granting standing to 
members of the nonprofit with five percent voting power); Jenkins, supra note 48, at 1120 (discuss-
ing “special interest” standing). 
 51. See, e.g., Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 57 Md. L. Rev. 1400, 
1433 (1998) (discussing Steeneck v. Univ. of Bridgeport, 668 A.2d 688 (Conn. 1995), which denied 
special interest standing to a life trustee of the defendant university, and arguing that the courts are 
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C. Governmental Oversight of Nonprofit Corporations 
Nonprofit organizations are also subject to both state and federal regula-
tory authority.52 At the state level regulatory authority is vested with 
attorneys general53 and at the federal level regulatory power is vested with 
the IRS.54 Traditionally, state attorneys general devote their resources toward 
enforcing fiduciary duties and good governance practices while the IRS fo-
cuses on taxation issues (not the least of which is the maintenance of tax-
exempt status).55 These governmental organizations generally engage in two 
types of regulatory schemes: ex ante disclosure regimes and ex post en-
forcement regimes. Neither set of regimes, however, has met with much 
success. 
The recent legislative focus on Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure require-
ments for nonprofits could lead one to believe that nonprofit corporations 
are not currently subject to wide-ranging disclosure requirements. Both the 
states and the IRS, however, impose disclosure rules upon nonprofit corpo-
rations.56 The states subject nonprofit corporations to a series of disclosure 
schemes.57 First, most states require annual registration before soliciting 
funds and annual financial reports regarding charitable solicitation efforts.58 
Indeed, most state attorneys general believe that the oversight of solicitation 
is the most pressing task they face in the realm of nonprofit regulation.59 
Second, most state attorneys general require annual reports regarding the 
status of the nonprofit’s assets.60 Third, most nonprofit managers, as a matter 
                                                                                                                      
not poised to liberalize standing requirements soon); Jaclyn A. Cherry, Update: The Current State of 
Nonprofit Director Liability, 37 Duq. L. Rev. 557, 571 (1999) (arguing that because damages in 
such suits flow back to the nonprofit corporation itself, there is little incentive to bring derivative 
actions); see also Lee, supra note 19, at 935 (discussing the collective action problems facing those 
who would seek to sue a nonprofit for breach of fiduciary duties by directors).  
 52. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 428. 
 53. See id. at 301; Brody, supra note 51, at 1406. 
 54. See Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 238–41 (reviewing section 501 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, which confers tax-exempt status upon numerous organizations). 
 55. Norman I. Silber, Nonprofit Interjurisdictionality, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 613, 618 
(2005); see also Fishman, supra note 4, 265–67. In recent years, however, there has been a much 
greater overlap of responsibilities, with the IRS taking on more regulation of fiduciary duties and 
good governance. Silber, supra, at 618. 
 56. See, e.g., 1 Marilyn E. Phelan, Nonprofit Enterprises: Corporations, Trusts, 
and Associations §§ 1:04, 2:23 (2000) (reviewing disclosure requirements for nonprofit organiza-
tions). 
 57. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 250.  
 58. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12585–12586 (West 2005); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-
190b to -190c; Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1760 (Supp. 2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 5004–
5005B (Supp. 2005); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 12, §§ 8E–8F (LexisNexis 2000 & Supp. 2006); N.H. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:28 (2003); N.Y. Exec. Law. §§ 172 to 172-b (McKinney Supp. 2006);  
see also The Multi-State Filere Project, The United Registration System, http:// 
www.multistatefiling.org/#yes_states (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (listing state solicitation regimes 
that will accept the multi-state unified registration form). 
 59. Brody, supra note 51, at 1405 n.28.  
 60. See, e.g., Cal. Gov’t. Code § 12586(a) (West 2005); N.Y. Est. Powers and Trusts 
Law § 8-1.4(f)(1) (McKinney 2002); Phelan, supra note 56, §§ 1:04, 2:23. 
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of state law, must issue financial and activities reports to their directors an-
nually.61 Finally, much of this state-required documentation is readily 
available to the public online.62 
The IRS also subjects nonprofits to significant disclosure requirements.63 
Congress recently required that all nonprofits make their IRS Form 990—a 
tax-return for exempt organizations—available to the public.64 The 990 filing 
provides substantial amounts of information about each nonprofit organiza-
tion, including the organization’s financial status, expenditures, lobbying 
activities, top salaries paid, and self-dealing transactions.65 Nonprofit or-
ganizations must mail copies of these filings to members of the public upon 
request.66 Much more significantly, 990 filings are available to the public 
online at www.guidestar.org.67 Congress hoped that these disclosure re-
quirements would foster public oversight of nonprofit organizations.68  
Congress’s perception of a need for increased public oversight of non-
profits was driven, in large part, by the failings of the ex post enforcement 
regime. A key aspect of this failure on both the state and federal level is a 
lack of funding. Although the numbers of nonprofit organizations have dra-
matically increased, as have donations to those organizations, “state and 
federal money spent monitoring [nonprofits from 1992 to 2002] remained 
flat or declined.”69 This is not a new phenomenon. State attorneys general 
have historically given limited resources, and a low priority, to nonprofit 
enforcement.70 The federal government faces a similar lack of funding. In-
                                                                                                                      
 61. See, e.g., Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 7.01(d)(1) (1987).  
 62. For example, both California and New York have searchable databases of state annual 
reporting requirements. California Department of Justice, Charities Search, http:// part-
ners.guidestar.org/partners/cadoj/index.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); Office of New York State 
Attorney General, Charities Bureau Registry Search, http://fairchild.oag.state.ny.us/online_forms/ 
search_charities.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007); see also Internet Prospector, State Charities Data-
bases on the Web, http://www.internet-prospector.org/charities.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) 
(collecting links to state, on-line nonprofit databases accessible to the public). 
 63. See Ellen W. McVeigh & Eve R. Borenstein, The Changing Accountability Climate and 
Resulting Demands for Improved “Fiduciary Capacity” Affecting the World of Public Charities, 31 
Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 119, 120 (2004); Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1311. 
 64. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(A) (2000). 
 65. See Peter Swords, How to Read the IRS Form 990 and Find Out What It Means, 
http://www.npccny.org/Form_990/990.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) (providing a nontechnical 
overview of the 990 Form). 
 66. I.R.C. § 6104(d)(1)(B). 
 67. The IRS has directly provided GuideStar’s sponsors with millions of Form 990 filings. 
GuideStar, Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.guidestar.org/help/faq_990.jsp#get990s (last 
visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 68. Staff of Joint Comm. on Taxation, 106th Cong., Study of Present-Law Tax-
payer Confidentiality and Disclosure Provisions as Required by Section 3802 of the 
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Volume II: Study of 
Disclosure Provisions Relating to Tax-Exempt Organizations 80 (Comm. Print 2000), 
available at http://www.house.gov/jct/s-1-00vol2.pdf. (last visited (Feb. 13, 2007) 
 69. Strom, supra note 1. 
 70. See Brody, supra note 51, at 1431 (“[A]ttorneys general rarely pursue their rights 
[against charities] with the same zeal that private parties exhibit.”); Hansmann, supra note 8, at 873–
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deed, a “former IRS Commissioner [recently] observed that the IRS had 
fewer resources than ever before with which to monitor nonprofit returns.”71 
In fact, the IRS has only 800 agents to monitor 1.6 million tax-exempt or-
ganizations.72 
A second major factor in the lack of effective governmental enforcement 
is the narrow scope of interest of, and inadequate remedies available to, 
regulators. State attorneys general tend to focus their limited enforcement 
efforts upon nonprofit asset protection.73 As Professor Dana Brakman Reiser 
recently illustrated, this focus on nonprofit financial accountability, while 
laudable in many respects, fails to address other pressing issues facing non-
profit corporations, namely, mission accountability (i.e., the shifting from 
charitable purpose x to charitable purpose y) and organizational accountabil-
ity (i.e., the ability of the nonprofit to function formally as a corporation).74 
Many serious fiduciary violations simply fail to pique the interest of state 
attorneys general.75 In addition to this narrow focus, enforcement agencies 
have traditionally been saddled with inadequate enforcement tools. For ex-
ample, until the last decade, revocation of tax-exempt status was the only 
enforcement tool available to the IRS to regulate 501(c)(3) public charities 
and to enforce the private inurement doctrine.76 Because this draconian pen-
alty was its lone option, the IRS rarely sanctioned wayward organizations 
except in the most egregious cases.77  
Given these systemic barriers to effective nonprofit board governance 
and to the oversight of nonprofit boards both by private and public actors, it 
is little wonder that Professor Marion Freemont-Smith observes in the  
                                                                                                                      
74 (“[I]n most states neither the office of the attorney general nor any other office of the state gov-
ernment devotes any appreciable amount of resources to the oversight of nonprofit firms.”); 
Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1310 (“[A]ttorneys general have limited time and resources, and . . . 
with their other significant duties to the public, monitoring charities often ranks low on their lists of 
priorities.”). 
 71. Silber, supra note 55, at 614. 
 72. Strom, supra note 1. 
 73. Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 208. 
 74. Id. passim. Some states, however, do attempt to regulate “mission accountability” at least 
in limited circumstances. See H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) (“Every health care 
charitable trust shall . . . conduct a community needs assessment to assist in determining the activi-
ties to be included in its community benefits plan . . . [which shall] identif[y] and prioritiz[e] . . . 
community needs that the health care charitable trust can address directly, or in collaboration with 
others.”). 
 75. This is not to say that the recent nonprofit scandals have not stirred attorneys general to 
step up their enforcement role, but the reaction has received mixed responses from scholars. See, 
e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 207 (noting the mixed reception); Mark Sidel, Law, Philan-
thropy and Social Class: Variance Power and the Battle for American Giving, 36 U.C. Davis L. 
Rev. 1145, 1151 (2003) (expressing concern for political pitfalls in enforcement). 
 76. Fishman & Schwarz, supra note 16, at 495. 
 77. Id. With the introduction of “intermediate sanctions,” the Service may now penalize 
nonprofit officers and directors in their personal capacity for reaping excess benefits from transac-
tions with their nonprofit organizations and, for more egregious violations, impose an excise tax on 
the organization. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000); Bruce R. Hopkins, The Law of Intermediate Sanc-
tions: A Guide for Nonprofits (2003) (providing a thorough review of Intermediate Sanctions). 
As a result, the Service has stepped up its enforcement efforts. 
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opening to her treatise on nonprofit organizations that “[a] distinguishing 
feature of the nonprofit sector is the freedom within which its component 
entities are allowed to operate.”78 
II. State Reforms for Nonprofits—Sarbanes-Oxley-Style 
The coupling of ineffective governance regimes with recent nonprofit 
scandals led the nonprofit community, almost from the moment the  
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed, to push for voluntary adoption of many of 
the applicable provisions of the Act.79 Seeing voluntary adoption as insuffi-
cient, however, numerous states have passed or considered legislation that 
mandates Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure, governance, and auditing re-
quirements.80 This Part briefly reviews the sweeping Sarbanes-Oxley-style 
reforms proposed in New York and Massachusetts (which are the most ag-
gressive Sarbanes-Oxley-inspired nonprofit reforms introduced to date)  
and the more limited—but enacted—reforms from California, Connecticut, 
Kansas, Maine, and New Hampshire. 
A. Disclosure Reforms 
Following the model of Sarbanes-Oxley, recent nonprofit legislation has 
focused on enhanced disclosure of financial data as the key element of regu-
latory reform. Certification of financial statements by top corporate officers 
is one of the most widely publicized of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms.81 This 
requirement mandates that officers of corporations subject to the Act sign 
their financial reports as a means of certifying the accuracy of the data and 
the soundness of the methodology used to obtain the data.82 This certifica-
tion process is also a key disclosure feature of many recent, Sarbanes-
Oxley-like nonprofit reforms. One version of the New York bill, for exam-
ple, employed almost identical language to that found in Sarbanes-Oxley. It 
required top managers of nonprofit organizations with more than $1 million 
                                                                                                                      
 78. Fremont-Smith, supra note 2, at 1. 
 79. See, e.g., Jeannie C. Frey, Duties and Rules of Nonprofit Corporation Directors in To-
day’s Environment: Has Sarbanes-Oxley Changed Anything, http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/ 
corporateresponsibility/clearinghouse/03spring/24/protecting_directors.pdf; Thomas Silk, Ten 
Emerging Principles of Governance of Nonprofit Corporations, 43 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 35 
(2004) (outlining principles of good nonprofit governance post Sarbanes-Oxley); Szymanski, supra 
note 32, at 1305 (“Even if [state] reforms do not come to pass, it can nonetheless be expected that 
there will be pressure on nonprofit institutions to borrow some of the principles of good governance 
espoused by the Act for their own purposes.”); BoardSource & Independent Sector, The Sarbanes-
Oxley Act and Implications for Nonprofit Organizations, http://www.guidestar.org/news/features/ 
sarbanes_oxley.jsp (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 80. Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1312; see Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 560–61, 567, 
573; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 208–09, at 268. 
 81. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of Corporate 
Governance?, 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1189, 1200 (2003) (reviewing this requirement and noting its wide 
notoriety). 
 82. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(a)(1)–(3), Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 7241 (Supp. III 2003)).  
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in annual revenues (or $3 million in assets) to verify both the soundness of 
the data in mandated internal financial reports and the reliability of proce-
dures used to obtain the data, and to disclose any deficiencies in these 
controls and any relevant frauds.83 Under this New York proposal, nonprofit 
organizations with smaller annual revenues would be subject to a less rigor-
ous verification regime.84 Proposed Massachusetts legislation also relies 
upon executive certification. Under the Massachusetts approach, nonprofit 
officers would make certifications similar to those required by the New York 
bill in regard to annual fiscal reports due to the attorney general.85 Again, 
like the New York bill, the Massachusetts bill would offer a less demanding 
certification regime for nonprofit organizations with less than $500,000 in 
annual revenues.86  
Several states have actually enacted Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure re-
forms. Connecticut, for instance, requires nonprofit organizations with over 
$200,000 in annual revenues (excluding government grants) to submit to the 
attorney general annual, audited financial statements signed by two officers 
who attest to the veracity of the information.87 Kansas law, like the proposed 
Massachusetts bill, now requires annual financial statements signed by two 
officers from all nonprofit organizations, and requires that these statements 
be audited if the organization has over $500,000 in annual revenues.88 
Maine, taking a tougher stance, requires signed or sworn audited financial 
statements from all but the smallest nonprofit organizations.89 Other states 
have adopted disclosure regimes without requiring officer certification. New 
Hampshire, for instance, has adopted a system wherein larger nonprofits, 
based on annual revenues, must submit annual financial statements to the 
attorney general.90 Finally, in California, nonprofit organizations with annual 
gross revenues of $2 million or more must make audited financial state-
ments available to the attorney general and the public.91 In sum, the 
disclosure-focused approach adopted in Sarbanes-Oxley has had a strong 
                                                                                                                      
 83. Compare S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. § 1(e)(1)–(4) (N.Y. 2004), with Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 302(2)–(3); see also Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 251 (discussing the 
similarity between the New York proposal and Sarbanes-Oxley in detail). The latest nonprofit re-
forms put forward by the New York Attorney General have omitted certification requirements. 
Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 571. 
 84. S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. § 1(d) (N.Y. 2004). 
 85. Mass. A.G. Proposal, supra note 10, § 3(g) (adopting Sarbanes-Oxley-like certification 
requirements with a two-tiered level of certification that, like New York’s bill, requires a more vig-
orous level of certifications from officers of nonprofits with larger annual revenues). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 21a-190b, 21a-190c (Supp. 2006).  
 88. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 17-1763(b)(15), (c) (Supp. 2005). 
 89. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 5004(3), (4)(C)(1), (4)(D)(1). Section 5006(1)(D) ex-
empts organizations with less than $10,000 in revenue from these requirements. Id. 
 90. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7.28(III-a) to (III-b) (Supp. 2005). 
 91. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(e)(1) (West 2005). 
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appeal for state-based nonprofit reforms, constituting the bulk of the recent 
initiatives.92  
B. Governance Reforms 
Sarbanes-Oxley also imposes a series of governance reforms that have 
spawned similar initiatives in the nonprofit community. The Act mandates 
that publicly traded corporations form audit committees,93 that directors who 
sit on these audit committees be independent94 (i.e., they may not receive 
extra benefits for serving on the committee and they may not be officers of 
the corporation),95 and that at least one member of the audit committee be a 
financial expert.96 The Act also tasks audit committees with new responsi-
bilities.97 Beyond structural board issues, Sarbanes-Oxley prohibits publicly 
traded corporations from making personal loans to directors or top officers,98 
and the Act envisions the adoption of a financial officer’s code of ethics.99  
Many states have enacted, or are considering, similar reforms for non-
profit organizations. While audit committees have been a required feature of 
for-profit board governance in publicly traded companies since 1999, they 
have not been a prominent component of nonprofit governance.100 The  
recent Sarbanes-Oxley-style nonprofit reforms change this landscape. In 
California, nonprofit corporations with more than $2 million in gross annual 
revenues must establish an audit committee composed of independent mem-
bers who, in accordance with Sarbanes-Oxley, may not be employees of the 
corporation or receive additional compensation for service on the audit 
committee.101 Additionally, under California law, nonprofit corporation audit 
                                                                                                                      
 92. See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, passim. 
 93. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 205(a), Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 78c(a) (Supp. III 2003)) (requiring either the adoption of an audit committee or that the 
functions of the audit committee be performed by the board as a whole). 
 94. Id. § 301. 
 95. Id. (“In order to be considered to be independent . . . a member of an audit committee of 
an issuer may not, other than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of 
directors, or any other board committee—(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory 
fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.”). 
 96. Id. § 407 (“[E]ach issuer [must] . . . disclose whether or not, and if not, the reasons there-
for, the audit committee of that issuer is comprised of at least 1 member who is a financial expert 
. . . .”). 
 97. Id. §§ 202, 204. 
 98. Id. § 402(a). 
 99. Id. § 406 (requiring the SEC to issue disclosure rules regarding whether or not covered 
corporations have adopted said ethical codes, and if not, why not). 
 100. See New York Stock Exchange, Listed Company Manual, http://www.nyse.com/ 
Frameset.html?nyseref=&displayPage=/listed/1022221393251.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007) 
(providing that listed companies must have audit committees in compliance with SEC rules in Sec-
tion 303A.06); National Association of Securities Dealers, Bylaws of The National Association of 
Securities Dealers, Inc., art. IX, § 5,, http://nasd.complinet.com/nasd/display/display.html?rbid= 
1189&element_id=1159000085 (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
 101. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005). The Act allows for non-director members 
of the audit committee but excludes “members of the staff, including the president or chief executive 
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committees are charged with responsibilities very similar to those imposed 
under Sarbanes-Oxley, such as hiring CPAs, reviewing and accepting audit 
reports, and approving nonaudit services offered by accounting firms.102 Un-
der the New York bill, similar Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms would be 
imposed. Nonprofit corporations with $1 million in annual revenues or $3 
million in assets would be required to establish audit committees103 com-
posed of independent members104 with duties similar to those imposed in 
California. The proposed Massachusetts bill would impose similar require-
ments for nonprofit corporations with $750,000 in annual revenues.105  
The states have added some governance reforms different from those 
found in Sarbanes-Oxley as well. The California Nonprofit Integrity Act, for 
instance, requires boards to review and approve CEO and CFO compensa-
tion to ensure it is just and reasonable.106 Under the New York bill, large 
nonprofit boards would be required to form executive committees.107 More-
over, many states have been ahead of Sarbanes-Oxley in terms of 
prohibiting loans to officers and directors.108  
                                                                                                                      
officer and the treasurer or chief financial officer.” Id. Further, “[i]f the corporation has a finance 
committee, it must be separate from the audit committee . . . . and members of the finance commit-
tee shall constitute less than one-half of the membership of the audit committee.” Id. Finally, 
“[m]embers of the audit committee shall not receive any compensation from the corporation in 
excess of the compensation, if any, received by members of the board of directors for service on the 
board and shall not have a material financial interest in any entity doing business with the corpora-
tion.” Id. This definition of independence closely follows the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. See Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 § 301 (audit committee members may not “(i) accept any consulting, advisory, or 
other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary 
thereof.”). 
 102. Compare Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005) (making the audit committee 
responsible for the following: recommending the hiring and firing of CPAs and negotiating their 
compensation, conferring with the auditor to ensure that the nonprofit’s financial affairs are in order, 
reviewing and accepting the audit, approving any non-audit services offered by the CPA’s account-
ing firm subject to the U.S. Comptroller’s Yellow Book), with Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 
§ 202(a)(1) (requiring audit committees to preapprove all auditing and non-auditing services), id. 
§ 204 (requiring audit committees to review the reports of auditors), id. § 301 (holding audit com-
mittees “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any 
registered public accounting firm”). 
 103. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(1), 2004 Leg., 227th Leg. (N.Y. 2004). As Sarbanes-Oxley requires, 
see Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 205(a), if a nonprofit corporation does not form an audit commit-
tee, the entire board becomes charged with these duties. S.B. 4836 § 4(g)(2), 2003 Leg., 227th Sess. 
(N.Y. 2003).  
 104. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B § 4(g)(3)(A). To qualify as independent, directors may not “accept any 
consulting fee, advisory fee, or other compensation or other benefits from the corporation,” except 
compensation received as a member of the board or its committees, id. § 4(g)(3), or have engaged in 
an interested transaction with the corporation within the last year, id. § 4(g)(3)(B). 
 105. Mass. A.G. Proposal, supra note 10, § 8P (closely following the New York bill). New 
Hampshire’s act does not require audit committees. H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004). 
 106. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(g). The requirement of reasonable pay for nonprofit manag-
ers is also required under the I.R.C. See I.R.C. § 4958 (2000). Sarbanes-Oxley itself does not speak 
directly to concepts such as just and reasonable compensation, but it does deal with executive com-
pensation in many other respects. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 304 (prohibiting certain types 
of executive bonuses). 
 107. N.Y. S.B. 4836-B. 
 108. E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 5236 (requiring that loans be approved by the attorney general); 
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 7:19-a (2003) (prohibiting loans); N.Y. Not-for-Profit Corp. Law § 716 
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C. Auditing Reforms 
Finally, Sarbanes-Oxley requires a host of auditing reforms.109 Once 
again, recent nonprofit reform proposals were inspired by Sarbanes-Oxley.110 
Many nonprofits, however, do not share the same level of auditing sophisti-
cation that one expects of publicly traded companies.111 Thus, state 
proposals for nonprofits tend to focus simply on requiring audited financial 
statements. This is the case for nonprofit organizations that meet minimum 
annual revenues under the California, Connecticut, Kansas, Maine and New 
Hampshire legislation.112  
III. Dubious Efficacy of Disclosure 
As noted above, the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms closely 
mimic the disclosure, governance, and auditing reforms designed for for-
profit organizations. Most nonprofit law scholars contend, however, that 
reflexive, wholesale importation of for-profit regulatory regimes into the 
nonprofit community is ill advised.113 The Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit 
reforms have received a similar reception. Commentators have argued 
that these acts would be too costly, disincentivize donations, and make it 
                                                                                                                      
(2005) (prohibiting loans); Revised Model Nonprofit Corp. Act § 8.32 (1987) (prohibiting 
loans). The majority of states still allow 501(c)(3) public charities (private foundations are prohib-
ited from making such loans under the I.R.C.) to make loans to directors and officers, which 
continues to be seen as a problem in the nonprofit community. Harvy Lipman & Grant Williams, 
Assets on Loan: Nonprofit groups lend millions to officials, Chronicle study finds, Chron. Philan-
thropy, Feb. 5, 2005, at 1 (reporting that between 1998 and 2001, 501(c)(3) charitable 
organizations made $142 million in personal loans to top officers).  
 109. E.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 101–209. 
 110. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 573. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(e)(1) (requiring audits for organizations with more than $2 
million in revenue); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, §§ 5004(4)(d)(1), 5006 (2005) (requiring audits for 
organizations with more than $10,000 in annual revenues); S.B. 946, 2005 Gen. Assem., Jan 2005 
Sess. (Conn. 2005) (requiring audits for organizations with more than $200,000 in annual revenues); 
S.B. 121, 2005 Leg., 2004–2005 Sess. (Kan. 2005) (requiring audits for organizations with more 
than $500,000 in annual revenues); H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) (requiring audits 
for organizations with more than $1 million in revenue). New York and Massachusetts required 
auditing under certain circumstances prior to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms. 
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 12 § 8F (LexisNexis 2000); N.Y. Exec. Law § 172-b(1), (2). 
 113. E.g., Jeffrey A. Alexander & Bryan J. Weiner, The Adoption of the Corporate Govern-
ance Model by Nonprofit Organizations, 8 Nonprofit Mgmt. & Leadership 223, 223 (1998) 
(“[T]he adoption of structures and practices from the for-profit sector is neither a feasible nor even a 
desirable solution to problems facing many nonprofit organizations.”); Michael C. Hone, Aristotle 
and Lyndon Baines Johnson: Thirteen Ways of Looking at Blackbirds and Nonprofit Corporations—
The American Bar Association’s Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act, 39 Case W. Res. L. 
Rev. 751, 759 (1989) (“[N]onprofit laws are the poor stepchild of the state business statutes.”); 
Manne, supra note 25, at 229 (“[S]traight application of for-profit corporate fiduciary law would be 
unsuitable.”); Howard L. Oleck, Mixtures of Profit and Nonprofit Corporation Purposes and Opera-
tions, 16 N. Ky. L. Rev. 225, 243 (1989) (arguing that development of the Nonprofit Model Act by 
the ABA’s business section is inappropriate “because that section is the wrong one for planning law 
for altruistic, voluntaristic, pro bono organizations.”). 
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more difficult to attract qualified directors.114 In addition to such costs, 
others have noted that these reforms are often duplicative and fail to  
focus upon nonprofit-specific issues of corporate governance such as 
mission creep and organizational unaccountability.115 While the  
Sarbanes-Oxley-style governance and auditing reforms may bear fruit, as 
discussed below,116 this Part contends that the disclosure-focused reforms 
that form the bulk of these state initiatives will not assist in fostering 
improved nonprofit governance. We lack institutions in the nonprofit 
sector that would make use of such mandated information and legal 
compliance schemes seldom inspire moral conduct without concomitant 
shifts in organizational culture. 
A. Mandatory Disclosures Unlikely to Be Used 
As currently situated, it appears doubtful that increased disclosure of fi-
nancial data will foster stronger governmental oversight of nonprofit 
governance. First, as noted above, state nonprofit regulators are significantly 
underfunded given the scope of their regulatory mission.117 Yet none of the 
states’ Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms come with increased funding for state 
attorneys general.118 Without funding, these disclosure documents seem 
fated to languish in the basements of state attorneys generals’ offices. Sec-
ond, historically most government nonprofit enforcement efforts have been 
initiated by affiliates of the nonprofit, or by investigative journalists.119 Nev-
ertheless, these disclosure-focused acts do not protect such whistleblowers, 
who are already protected under Sarbanes-Oxley itself.120 Nor does journal-
istic access to this newly disclosed information, given the information 
already accessible online, appear worth the cost of providing it. Finally, be-
cause there is not a market-based regulatory system to act as a buffer to 
prevent the capture of state attorneys general by politically powerful non-
profit actors, even increased activity by attorneys general may be 
unhelpful.121 
                                                                                                                      
 114. Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316–20. 
 115. See e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 561; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 208. 
 116. See infra notes 186–194 and accompanying text. 
 117. See supra notes 70–71 and accompanying text. 
 118. See e.g., Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17510.5; Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 12581–12599.7; 
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 21a-190b to 190c, 190f, 190h (2005); Kan. Stat. Ann. 17–1763, -6002 
(2005); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 9, § 5003–5005, 5007–5009, 5011–5012,5017–5018; N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 7:28, :32-f (2004). 
 119. Evelyn Brody, Whose Public? Parochialism and Paternalism in State Charity Law En-
forcement, 79 Ind. L.J. 937, 953 & n.60 (2004). 
 120. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 1107, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 1513(e) (Supp. III 2003)). 
 121. See, e.g., Mark Sidel, The Nonprofit Sector and the New State Activism, 100 Mich. L. 
Rev. 1312, 1334–35 (2002) (reviewing Norman I. Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The 
Emergence of the Nonprofit Sector (2001)) (providing this “capture” argument). 
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It is also doubtful that donors or other members of the public will make 
use of greater mandatory disclosure of financial data. One assumption un-
derlying these legislative efforts appears to be that donors will use this 
information when making gifts. Empirical studies, however, do not support 
this assumption. The data shows that small donations made by individuals 
are the backbone of the nonprofit sector. Donations by individuals account 
for 76.5% of all nonprofit contributions.122 The majority of these individu-
ally donated funds are given by households earning less than $100,000 
annually.123 Based on 2003 tax returns, the median amount given to non-
profit organizations per household is $700 annually.124 While reliable data is 
not available, the median donation per charity may be close to $100 per 
gift.125 Thus, the median household likely engages in seven $100 gift trans-
actions annually. Perhaps as a result of the relatively small scale of these 
transactions, most donors do not investigate the financial or governance 
practices of nonprofit organizations before donating.126 Large donors will not 
benefit from a strengthened, mandatory financial disclosure regime either. 
Nonprofits that seek to obtain large grants must provide the grantors with all 
the information the grantor desires, which is accomplished without legally 
imposed transparency rules. Federally funded nonprofit organizations, for 
example, must provide significant amounts of financial documentation to 
                                                                                                                      
 122. Giving USA Found., supra note 15, at 14. 
 123. Id. at 2 (based on 2003 tax returns). 
 124. Ctr. on Philanthropy at Ind. Univ., Average and Median Amounts of House-
hold Giving and Volunteering in 2002 from the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study 
(COPPS) 2003 Wave (March 2006), http://www.philanthropy.iupui.edu/Average%20Amounts-
Household%20Giving%20&%20Volunteering-2002.pdf. (last visited ) The average amount given 
was $1,872, but this figure is greatly increased by a small number of huge gifts at the top end.  
 125. This is a difficult statistic to establish. Most data regarding donations to charities comes 
from two sources: (1) IRS itemized tax returns, and (2) the Center on Philanthropy Panel Study 
(COPPS) (which is attached to the University of Michigan’s Panel Study of Income Dynamic). 
Neither data set includes information regarding per charity donations. Letter from Patrick M. 
Rooney, Professor of Economics and Philanthropic Studies and Director of Research for The Center 
on Philanthropy at Indiana University (Sept. 6, 2006) (on file with author). As a crude proxy for the 
median donation per charity, I am relying upon the median donation to the United Way in 2003, 
which was approximately $100. United Way, Non-Itemized Deduction Would Substantially Boost 
Charitable Giving, http://national.unitedway.org/news/statements/Non-itemized%20Flyer1.pdf. As 
the United Way is a top-five charity when measured either by revenues or by assets, this  
organization was picked to provide a crude proxy of per charity giving across the nation.  
William P. Barrett, the 200 Largest U.S. Charities, http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/18/ 
largest-charities-ratings_05charities_land.html (follow “Revenues” hyperlink for revenue rankings; 
follow “Net Assets” hyperlink for net asset rankings) (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). The key point, I 
hope, is not lost here. The median family engages in several relatively modest gift transactions total-
ing $700 per annum. 
 126. E.g., Katie Cunningham & Marc Ricks, Why Measure?, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev., 
Summer 2004, at 44 (finding donor interest in financial accountability negligible); William F. 
Meehan III et al., Investing in Society, Stan. Soc. Innovation Rev. Spring 2004, at 34, 35–36 
(reviewing studies that find that donors do not investigate the financial and governance practices of 
organizations before donating). 
MULLIGAN FINAL PAGINATED TYPE.DOC 5/8/2007 2:27 PM 
June 2007] What’s Good for the Goose 1999 
 
the federal government,127 as do recipients of funds from private grant-
making institutions.128 
B. Disclosure as an Instrumental Value 
These many failures illuminate broader insights about disclosure as a 
tool of corporate governance. At least since future Supreme Court Justice 
Louis Brandeis wrote his groundbreaking book in 1914,129 disclosure has 
come to be seen as a preeminent value of corporate governance amongst 
public intellectuals,130 business ethicists,131 legal academics,132 and within the 
nonprofit community.133 This high regard for transparency has a venerable 
philosophical lineage that reaches back to the pantheon of Western political 
                                                                                                                      
 127. E.g., Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Circular A-110, 
Uniform Administrative Requirements For Grants And Agreements With Institutions of 
Higher Education, Hospitals, and Other Non-Profit Organizations §§ 51–53 (1999), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars/a110/a110.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2007). 
In light of these requirements, the California Nonprofit Integrity Act, for example, exempts nonprof-
its funded by government grants from its requirements. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12583 (West 2004). 
Further, hospitals, educational institutions and religious organizations are not subject to the Act as 
these sectors are already heavily regulated under other bodies of law. Id. 
 128. E.g., Paul N. Ylvisaker, Foundations and Nonprofit Organizations, in The Nonprofit 
Sector: A Research Handbook 360, 365 (Walter W. Powell ed., 1987). 
 129. Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How Bankers Use It 92 (1914) 
(“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be 
the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.”). 
 130. See, e.g., Don Tapscott & David Ticoll, The Naked Corporation 62–93 (2003) 
(arguing that transparency is, in effect, a panacea to cure all corporate ills). 
 131. See, e.g., David S. Gelb & Joyce A. Strawser, Corporate Social Responsibility and Fi-
nancial Disclosures: An Alternative Explanation for Increased Disclosure, 33 J. Bus. Ethics 1 
(2001) (arguing that disclosure regimes are valuable even though empirical data does not suggest 
that such regimes have any financial benefits); Eleanor R. E. O’Higgins, Corruption, Underdevel-
opment, and Extractive Resource Industries: Addressing the Vicious Cycle, 16 Bus. Ethics Q. 235 
(2006) (contending that increased transparency by transnational corporations will assist in the reduc-
tion of international corporate corruption in the mineral extraction industry). 
 132. Matthew F. Gorra, On-Line Trading and United States Securities Policy: Evaluating the 
SEC’s Role in International Securities Regulation, 32 Cornell Int’l L.J. 209, 210 n.4 (1998) (“By 
imposing anti-fraud and disclosure requirements . . . the Commission preserves marketwide trans-
parency and, hence, fosters efficient domestic securities markets”); Jonathan R. Macey & Maureen 
O’Hara, Regulating Exchanges and Alternative Trading Systems: A Law and Economics Perspective, 
28 J. Legal Stud. 17, 31 (1999) (“[The SEC] has long believed that transparency . . . plays a fun-
damental role in the fairness and efficiency of the secondary markets . . . and improves the price 
discovery, fairness, competitiveness and attractiveness of U.S. markets.” (quoting United States 
Securities and Exchange Commission, Market 2000: An Examination of Current Equity 
Market Developments, IV-1 (1994), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/market2000.pdf)); 
Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Current and Future 
Investors, 89 Minn. L. Rev. 1044, 1044 (2005) (“The fundamental goal of securities law is to make 
markets more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby reducing asymmetric infor-
mation.”). 
 133. See, e.g., Mordecai Lee, Public Reporting: A Neglected Aspect of Nonprofit Accountabil-
ity, 15 Nonprofit Mgmt. & Leadership 169 (2004) (arguing that nonprofits should adopt a 
scheme of public reporting as one method to increase citizen confidence in their activities and in the 
sector as a whole). 
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thought.134 Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to make a fetish of disclo-
sure. It is cliché nowadays to state that having vast amounts of data without 
the resources to intelligently review and employ it is of no value, but that 
does not detract from the veracity of this insight as it relates to corporate 
disclosure regimes.135 This insight suggests, then, that disclosure is only of 
instrumental value. That is to say, corporate disclosure, either in the for-
profit or nonprofit sector, is normatively valuable only when institutions are 
established, or soon will be established, that enable interested parties to 
make use of the data to further some other ends (e.g., improved financial 
returns, improved environmental performance, or improved human rights 
enforcement).136 It follows that disclosure regimes not coupled with public 
or private institutions that enable interested parties to make use of the in-
formation are normatively valueless.137 But this is exactly what the Sarbanes-
Oxley-inspired nonprofit regimes intend to impose. 
Of course, the availability of more financial information as envisioned 
by the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms could change the donative 
environment. Indeed, some have suggested it is a lack of easily accessible 
data that causes this dearth of interest in nonprofit financial practices and 
that donors would review the data if it were readily available.138 This view 
                                                                                                                      
 134. See, e.g., Jeremy Bentham, Political Tactics 29–44 (Michael James et al. eds., 1999); 
Immanuel Kant, Eternal Peace, in The Philosophy of Kant 470 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1949); John 
Stuart Mill, Considerations of Representative Democracy 262 (H.B. Action ed., 1972); John 
Rawls, A Theory of Justice 16, 454 (1971); Jean Jacques Rousseau, Dedication to the Republic 
of Geneva, in Discourse on the Origin of Inequality 32–33 (G.D.H. Cole trans., 1988). 
 135. See Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities 
Markets, 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781, 787 (2001) (describing how corporate disclosure partially works in 
the United States “through a complex set of laws and private and public institutions that give inves-
tors reasonable assurance that the issuer is being (mostly) truthful,”); Nicole Dando & Tracey Swift, 
Transparency and Assurance: Minding the Credibility Gap, 44 J. Bus. Ethics 195 (2003) (arguing 
that increasing levels of disclosure of social, ethical and environmental performance by corporations 
and other organizations is not being accompanied by simultaneous greater levels of public trust and 
that a common metric for deciphering this data is needed to enhance the value of disclosures); 
Miriam Miquelon Weismann, Corporate Transparency or Congressional Window-Dressing? The 
Case Against Sarbanes-Oxley as a Means to Avoid Another Corporate Debacle: The Failed Attempt 
to Revive Meaningful Regulatory Oversight, 10 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 98 (2004) (contending that 
Congress’s goal of increasing corporate transparency by passing Sarbanes-Oxley is pointless be-
cause it is not coupled with effective SEC regulatory reform). 
 136. I am using the term institution quite broadly to include informal social practices or mar-
ket forces. That is, I would label wide-spread, individual, unorganized, accessing of Form 990 
filings by the public as an institution that makes use of disclosed data.  
 137. Of course, corporate disclosure might be inherently valuable—that is to say, corporate 
transparency might be normatively valuable regardless of the consequence that flows from such 
disclosures. See James J. Brummer, Accountability and the Restraint of Freedom: A Deontological 
Case for the Stricter Standard of Corporate Disclosure, 5 J. Bus. Ethics 155 (1986) (arguing, from 
a Kantian point of view, that corporate transparency is a good per se). A full refutation of this argu-
ment is beyond the scope of this Article, but I would ask the reader to engage in the following 
thought experiment: To be inherently valuable, one would have to agree that corporate transparency 
has normative force even in an environment where no one could make use of the information. While 
it is possible that this could be valued as adding authenticity to business endeavors or somehow 
recognizes the value of other moral agents, I find the concept of corporate transparency as inherently 
valuable untenable.  
 138. David Bornstein, Let’s Make Sure Worthy Groups Get Aid, Chron. Philanthropy, Jan. 
22, 2004, at 37 (offering this opinion). 
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strikes a sour note, however. First, as outlined above, vast amounts of non-
profit financial information is already available to the public online.139 Yet 
the majority of individual donors do not reference this material. There is 
little reason to think that adding more data to the public sphere will change 
that attitude. Indeed, increasing publicly available data may have the oppo-
site effect because donors may reach a point of information overload and 
fail to make use of new data.140 This problem would appear all the more 
pressing in the nonprofit sector because it lacks a well-developed market of 
financial experts to filter data for donors.141 
C. Compliance Focused 
The Sarbanes-Oxley-like disclosure reforms also suffer from an overly le-
galistic approach to ethical governance. Sarbanes-Oxley, and nonprofit 
reforms modeled upon it, by and large take a compliance approach to the pro-
duction of ethical board governance.142 These reforms are premised upon the 
belief that forcing nonprofit leaders to produce certain documents will lead to 
superior behavior in the future. The empirical data we have suggests that the 
mere production of compliance documents or ethics codes, without a con-
comitant change in the “ethical climate” in the organization, will not result in 
improved ethical behavior.143 Disclosure regimes that lack effective review by 
donors, government, or other market-based forces, such as those created under 
the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms, are unlikely to foster such a change in the 
ethical climate of wayward nonprofit organizations.144 Such legalistic regimes, 
instead of inspiring a renewed sense of ethical obligation, may lead to a pre-
occupation with fulfilling mandated processes and the loss of freedom to 
make innovative decisions required by an ethically sound organization.145 In 
light of this overwhelming evidence, one participant in this symposium  
                                                                                                                      
 139. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 140. E.g., Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its Consequences 
for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417, 419 (2003) (arguing that greater disclosure lacks 
value without improved means of using the information by for-profit investors and experts because 
the average investor experiences “information overload”).  
 141. Cf. id. at 432 (“As a practical matter, a company’s disclosures are largely ‘filtered’ 
through experts—various securities professionals and financial intermediaries—who research and 
process the information and whose trades and recommendations ultimately set securities prices.”). 
 142. Surendra Arjoon, Corporate Governance: An Ethical Perspective, 61 J. Bus. Ethics 343, 
345 (2005). 
 143. See generally Mark S. Schwartz, Effective Corporate Codes of Ethics: Perceptions of 
Code Users, 55 J. Bus. Ethics 323 (2004); Mark S. Schwartz, The Nature of the Relationship be-
tween Corporate Codes of Ethics and Behaviour, 32 J. Bus. Ethics 247 (2001); Linda Trevino et 
al., The Ethical Context in Organizations: Influences on Employee Attitudes and Behaviors, 8 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 447 (1998); Linda Trevino et al., Managing Ethics and Legal Compliance: What Works 
and What Hurts, 41 Cal. Mgmt. Rev. 131 (1999); Linda K. Trevino & Gary R. Weaver, Organiza-
tional Justice and Ethics Program “Follow-Through”: Influences on Employees’ Harmful and 
Helpful Behavior, 11 Bus. Ethics Q. 651 (2001). 
 144. E.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 9, at 583–87. 
 145. William H. Donaldson, Corporate Governance: What Has Happened and Where We 
Need To Go, Bus. Econ., July 2003, at 16, 18. 
MULLIGAN FINAL PAGINATED TYPE.DOC 5/8/2007 2:27 PM 
2002 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 105:1981 
 
contends that standard legalistic approaches to corporate governance are “con-
stitutionally incapable of producing socially responsible corporations in this 
current age of complexity and value pluralism . . . . [because] corporations are 
not being encouraged to develop new solutions to existing (or potential) prob-
lems, but only to meet a certain minimum level of behavior.”146 Such damning 
critiques appear all the worse in the nonprofit context. Because they are not 
accompanied by either increased funding for state regulators or an efficient 
non-governmental regulatory regime for nonprofits,147 Sarbanes-Oxley-
inspired reforms will impose the large costs of disclosure and verification pro-
cedures onto nonprofit organizations148 without any realistic hope that these 
rules will act as a deterrent. 
IV. Mistaken Moral Premise 
Assuming these many critiques of the recent Sarbanes-Oxley-like re-
forms are sound, they beg the question: How have so many legislative 
proposals gone awry? This Part argues that these legislative proposals start 
with an ethical framework that is inapplicable in the nonprofit context. Sar-
banes-Oxley posits a stockholder conception of business ethics, yet 
nonprofit corporations are quintessentially stakeholder organizations. Be-
cause nonprofit organizations have no stockholders to protect, the Sarbanes-
Oxley-like nonprofit reforms are mislaid. I contend that, with a clearer un-
derstanding of the appropriate ethical regime in which nonprofit 
corporations operate, future effective nonprofit reforms will be more easily 
crafted.  
A. Nonprofit Corporations and Stakeholder Theory 
Scholars of organizational ethics have formulated numerous theories regard-
ing the moral dimensions of business endeavors. Two of the leading normative 
theories149 of business ethics that are particularly relevant here are stockholder 
                                                                                                                      
 146. David Hess, Regulating Corporate Social Performance: A New Look at Social Account-
ing, Auditing, and Reporting, 11 Bus. Ethics Q. 307, 310 (2001). 
 147. Cf. Michael A. Perino, Enron’s Legislative Aftermath: Some Reflections on the Deter-
rence Aspects of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 76 St. John’s L. Rev. 671, 675–76 (2002) 
(describing, in the for-profit context, how strict rules work as deterrents only if there is some belief 
that they will be enforced).  
 148. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 71, 117 (2002) (discussing disclosure in the for-
profit sector and noting that “[m]onitoring-based systems have unexpectedly serious (and probably 
immeasurable) costs, which society should not impose without strong reason.”). 
 149. The following families of theories are often used in reference to descriptive claims, in-
strumental claims, and normative claims of business organizations. For example, stakeholder theory 
is often used in reference to all three types of assertions. See Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, 
The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 65, 69–73 (1995). There is a similar dual empirical and normative use in the literature 
of stockholder (or agency) theory. See Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward Freeman, Ethics and Agency 
Theory: An Introduction, in Ethics and Agency Theory 3, 3–4 (Norman E. Bowie & R. Edward 
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theory and stakeholder theory.150 From the stockholder theory perspective, 
corporations are merely arrangements by which investors advance funds to 
managers in return for an equity interest in the venture.151 Under this view, 
directors and officers are agents of the stockholders and are bound as fiduciar-
ies to pursue only the ends established by the stockholders.152 Milton 
Friedman, often portrayed as a standard bearer for this view, sums up the cor-
poration’s moral duties well: “The social responsibility of business is to 
increase its profits . . . [constrained by law and] ethical custom.”153 It is worth 
noting, as Friedman makes clear, that stockholder theory does not condone the 
pursuit of stockholder value by any means without moral constraints, as some 
detractors imply, but rather the pursuit of stockholder value via normatively 
permissible means.154 While some commentators remain proponents of  
                                                                                                                      
Freeman eds., 1992). In this Article, unless I specifically so delineate, I will use these terms to refer 
only to normative claims. 
 150. See John Hasnas, The Normative Theories of Business Ethics: A Guide for the Perplexed, 
8 Bus. Ethics Q. 19 (1998). Hasnas also identifies a third leading family of theories, namely, social 
contract theory. This family of normative business values is of great importance in current business 
ethics scholarship. See, e.g., Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Ties That Bind (1999); 
Thomas Donaldson & Thomas W. Dunfee, Toward a Unified Conception of Business Ethics, 19 
Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 252 (1994). The root idea expounded upon by Donaldson and Dunfee is that 
normative duties for business entities may be established via the integration of a set of hyper-
norms—formulated in a Rawlsian manner—with extant contracts (including implied contracts) 
between members of specific economic communities. A full discussion of Integrative Social Con-
tract Theory, as it is styled, is beyond the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, the work of social 
contract theorists such as Donaldson and Dunfee is an attempt to outline normative duties owed by 
business entities to persons beyond stockholders. As such, most, if not all, of the following discus-
sion of the inapplicability of stockholder theory to nonprofits—and thus the applicability of 
stakeholder theory—could very well be reconstituted in terms of social contract theory. Finally, this 
focus on normative duties of business entities themselves in this Article is not to say that business 
ethicists do not discuss other families of normative theories as well, most notably virtue ethics. See 
Robert C. Solomon, Victims of Circumstances? A Defense of Virtue Ethics in Business, 13 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 43 (2003). Virtue ethics, however, is more focused on the character of individuals than on 
the normative duties of organizations themselves. As such, this family of theories will not be a focus 
in this Article.  
 151. Hasnas, supra note 150, at 24. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. 
Times (Sept. 13, 1970) (Magazine), reprinted in Business Ethics 153, 153 (W. Michael Hoffman 
and Jennifer Mills Moore eds., 2d ed. 1990); see also Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Free-
dom 133 (1962) (“[T]here is one and only one social responsibility of business—to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as it stays within the rules of the 
game, which is to say, engages in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.”). 
 154. Hasnas, supra note 150, at 22. 
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stockholder theory,155 the majority of thinkers in the business-ethics field con-
sider it passé.156 
By most accounts, stakeholder theory is the preeminent contemporary 
normative theory of business ethics, especially among business practitio-
ners.157 The basic view is that, regardless of the potential to increase returns 
to investors, corporate managers morally ought to make decisions that bene-
fit all stakeholders in the corporation, not just stockholders.158 In short, 
“[s]takeholder theory stands . . . against th[e] univocal view of shareholders 
über alles [represented by stockholder theory.]”159 Stakeholders, pursuant to 
this conception of business ethics, include many different people, such as 
stockholders, creditors, employees, the local community, clients, and suppli-
ers.160 The moral imperative for corporate managers is to balance the often 
competing, yet morally equal, needs and desires of this diverse set of inter-
ests.161 
                                                                                                                      
 155. See, e.g., John Dobson, Defending the Stockholder Model: A Comment on Hasnas, and 
on Dunfee’s MOM, 9 Bus. Ethics Q. 337 (1999) (arguing that the stockholder theory allows for the 
translation of ethical concerns of the public into readily identifiable market pressures to which cor-
porate managers can react); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Economic 
Structure of Corporate Law 1–39 (1991) (presenting an economists perspective of stockholder 
theory); Hasnas, supra note 150 (arguing that stockholder theory is capable of deontological founda-
tions traditionally thought to be the sole domain of stakeholder theory); Alexei M. Marcoux, A 
Fiduciary Argument Against Stakeholder Theory, 13 Bus. Ethics Q. 1 (2003) (arguing that stock-
holder theory furthers the special moral status of investors in a business venture). 
 156. Thomas Donaldson, The Ethics of International Business 45 (1989) (arguing that 
stockholder theory is an outmoded view of business ethics); Thomas Donaldson & Lee E. Preston, 
The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and Implications, 20 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 65, 81–82 (1995) (similar); William M. Evan & R. Edward Freeman, A Stakeholder 
Theory of the Modern Corporation: Kantian Capitalism, in Ethical Theory and Business 75, 
76–77 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 4th ed. 1993) (similar); Robert C. Solomon, 
Ethics and Excellence 45 (1993) (similar).  
 157. See Kevin Gibson, The Moral Basis of Stakeholder Theory, 26 J. Bus. Ethics 245 
(2000) (noting the overwhelming dominance of stakeholder theory in scholarly writings). 
 158. Eric W. Orts & Alan Strudler, The Ethical and Environmental Limits of Stakeholder 
Theory, 12 Bus. Ethics Q. 215, 216–20 (2002) (providing overview of stakeholder theory); Hasnas, 
supra note 150, at 25 (same). 
 159. Orts & Strudler, supra note 158, at 216. 
 160. Determining who ought to be a stakeholder has been a source of much debate in the 
business ethics community. See, e.g., Ronald K. Mitchell et al., Toward a Theory of Stakeholder 
Identification and Salience: Defining the Principle of Who and What Really Counts, 22 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 853, 857 (1997). Very grossly speaking, there are two camps. Many look to a narrow 
view of who a stakeholder is, based upon having some asset at risk. See, e.g., Max B. E. Clarkson, A 
Stakeholder Framework for Analyzing and Evaluating Corporate Social Performance, 20 Acad. 
Mgmt. Rev. 92, 105–07 (1995). Others seek a broader conception of stakeholder, which would 
include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organiza-
tion’s purpose.” R. Edward Freeman, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach 55 
(1984). We need not troll the depths of these waters for the purposes of this Article. 
 161. See R. Edward Freeman, Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation, in Ethical 
Issues in Business: A Philosophical Approach 314 (Thomas Donaldson & Patricia H. Werhane 
eds., 6th ed. 1998) (“The task of management in today’s corporation is akin to that of King Solo-
mon. The stakeholder theory does not give primacy to one stakeholder group over another, though 
there will surely be times when one group will benefit at the expense of others. In general, however, 
management must keep the relationships among stakeholders in balance.”). 
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As every nontrivial activity assumes a philosophical perspective, corpo-
rate governance reforms also presuppose a particular normative view, such 
as a stockholder or stakeholder view. Sarbanes-Oxley is no exception. I con-
tend that Congress employed a stockholder conception of business ethics 
when it passed the Act. Congress made this clear in the Preamble, stating its 
goal as “protect[ing] investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures.”162 Legal scholars also agree that the Act is focused 
almost exclusively upon the needs of stockholders.163 Moreover, the stock-
holder perspective exemplified in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is not 
aberrational, but rather a continuation of the long-standing focus of corpo-
rate law on the protection of stockholder interest.164 Even if this attribution 
of a stockholder normative perspective to Sarbanes-Oxley is too strong, 
there can be little argument that the Act assumes that investors are far and 
away the most important stakeholders in corporations either as a normative 
matter165 or for other efficiency reasons.166 
This stockholder-focused normative approach adopted by Sarbanes-
Oxley—and derivatively by the nearly identical disclosure-based reforms 
imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit legislation—is completely 
inapposite in the nonprofit sector. Simply put, nonprofit corporations lack 
stockholders and they overwhelmingly lack voting members who would 
have interests similar to stockholders.167 A nonprofit reform regime based 
upon a normative principle of protecting stockholders’ interests is not only 
inapplicable but it also violates the venerable moral principle of “ought im-
plies can.”168 That is to say, because nonprofits cannot protect stockholder 
interests (as these stockholders do not exist), they ought not be morally 
                                                                                                                      
 162. See supra note 7. 
 163. See, e.g., Arjoon, supra note 142, at 345; Brakman Reiser, supra note 8, at 239; 
Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316.  
 164. See, e.g., John H. Matheson & Brent A. Olson, Corporate Law and the Longterm Share-
holder Model of Corporate Governance, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 1313, 1326 (1992) (“[T]he fundamental 
goal of corporate law is so theoretically and historically obvious that it need not be explicated: the 
goal is to maximize corporate—and thus shareholder—welfare.”). 
 165. See, e.g., Kenneth E. Goodpaster, Business Ethics and Stakeholder Analysis, 1 Bus. 
Ethics Q. 53 (1991) (arguing that corporations owe special moral duties to shareholders); Kenneth 
E. Goodpaster and Thomas E. Holloran, In Defense of a Paradox, 4 Bus. Ethics Q. 423 (1994) 
(same). But see John R. Boatright, Fiduciary Duties and the Shareholder-Management Relation: Or, 
What’s So Special About Shareholders?, 4 Bus. Ethics Q. 393 (1994) (arguing against the unique-
ness of stockholder interests); R. Edward Freeman, The Politics of Stakeholder Theory: Some Future 
Directions, 4 Bus. Ethics Q. 409, 413 (1994) (same). 
 166. See, e.g., Dobson, supra note 155, at 339 (“Within financial-economic theory, therefore, 
the stockholder model is not praised as a normative ideal because stockholders are viewed as in any 
way morally superior to other stakeholders, but rather because a focus on stockholders—or more 
specifically on stock price—leads to a minimum of agency costs, which in turn benefits all stake-
holders.”). 
 167. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 168. Kant is generally credited with the first published exposition of this principle—although 
in true Kantian fashion his discussion is not quite so pithy. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practi-
cal Reason 149–53 (Lewis White Beck trans., 3d ed., Macmillan 1993) (1788).  
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obliged to do so.169 Thus, the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms start not 
merely with an inapplicable moral premise but with an impossible moral 
imperative.  
Adopting a stakeholder view as an initial normative premise, by con-
trast, is the appropriate moral framework for nonprofit reforms. First, as a 
descriptive matter, nonprofit corporations are archetypal stakeholder organi-
zations. As discussed above,170 nonprofit corporations lack stockholders. The 
board has responsibilities to promote the nonprofit’s mission and is respon-
sible to a wide range of stakeholders, including donors, clients, employees, 
and taxpayers.171 This list of stakeholders is nearly identical to the standard 
list of stakeholders of for-profit corporations.172 As with stakeholders in for-
profit corporations,173 these nonprofit stakeholders have differing expecta-
tions of the nonprofit corporation, which in turn affects the board’s concept 
of accountability.174 
Second, the normative principles that ground for-profit stakeholder the-
ory map nearly one-to-one with standard normative principles offered for 
nonprofit governance. Professors Evans and Freeman—leading proponents 
of stakeholder-style for-profit corporate governance—have condensed ethi-
cal governance practices into two principles. The first axiom, the “principle 
of corporate legitimacy,” posits that “the corporation should be managed for 
the benefit of its stakeholders: its customers, suppliers, owners, employees, 
and the local communities.”175 The second principle, the “stakeholder fiduci-
ary principle,” states that:  
[M]anagement bears a fiduciary relationship to stakeholders and to the cor-
poration as an abstract entity. It must act in the interests of the stakeholders 
as their agent, and it must act in the interests of the corporation to ensure 
the survival of the firm, safeguarding the long-term stakes of each group.176  
Commentators on ethical nonprofit governance have coalesced upon 
similar principles. John Carver, for instance, argues that nonprofits should 
be governed for the benefit of “the various stakeholders to whom the board 
owes its primary allegiance,” much like Evans and Freeman’s principle of 
legitimacy.177 Professor David Smith presents another standard principle of 
ethical, nonprofit board governance when he asserts that the board should be 
loyal to the mission of the corporation and that directors should “attend to 
                                                                                                                      
 169. Of course, this is merely the contrapositive formulation of the same principle. 
 170. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 171. Miller, supra note 23, at 442 (“Nonprofit boards are answerable to multiple constituen-
cies with differing expectations”); O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 206. 
 172. See supra note 160 and accompanying text. 
 173. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 174. Miller, supra note 23, at 442–43. 
 175. Evan & Freeman, supra note 156, at 82. 
 176. Id. 
 177. John Carver, Boards That Make a Difference: A New Design for Leadership in 
Nonprofit and Public Organizations 15 (2d ed., Jossey-Bass 1997). 
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the goals, values, and expectations of the larger community.”178 This princi-
ple is much like Evans and Freeman’s stakeholder fiduciary principle179 and 
the fiduciary duties imposed upon nonprofit directors by law.180 As with for-
profit stakeholder theory,181 Smith notes that a key ethical function of the 
nonprofit board is to balance the competing needs and desires of various 
stakeholders.182 Stakeholder theory, rather than the stockholder theory upon 
which the Sarbanes-Oxley-style reforms are based, is the superior rubric for 
formulating and evaluating ethical nonprofit governance.  
B. Stakeholder Theory and Future Nonprofit Reforms 
Adopting a stakeholder approach would have a substantial effect upon 
future nonprofit reforms. By focusing on the numerous hurdles that stake-
holder organizations must overcome instead of reflexively imposing a for-
profit reform regime, future legislation could be more effective in improving 
ethical board governance.  
First, future nonprofit reforms should focus less on disclosing data to 
uninterested parties and more on the difficulty nonprofit corporations find in 
communicating with various interested stakeholders. One means of accom-
plishing this goal is through the increased use of advisory boards, which 
would allow nonprofit organizations to bring in larger and more diverse 
stakeholder representatives without imposing the full burden of being a for-
mal board member upon these individuals or further enlarging the board of 
directors.183  
Additionally, nonprofit reforms should strive to address the accountabil-
ity vacuum within which many nonprofit boards operate. Empirical data 
suggests that nonprofit boards that can identify lines of accountability have 
superior abilities to monitor activity by management because these boards 
are able to identify performance and evaluation criteria.184 As such, state 
                                                                                                                      
 178. David H. Smith, Entrusted: The Moral Dimension of Trusteeship 11 (1995).  
 179. Evan & Freeman, supra note 156, at 82. 
 180. See Summers v. Cherokee Children & Family Servs., Inc., 112 S.W.3d 486, 504 (Tenn. 
Ct. App. 2002) (holding that director’s fiduciary duties are owed to the nonprofit corporation itself 
and not to particular persons).  
 181. See supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 182. Smith, supra note 178, at 22 (arguing that nonprofit boards must balance competing 
stakeholder interests in a manner that is “faithful to the core intention of the donor or founding 
group or to the human needs [the board is] meant to address”). 
 183. Judith R. Saidel, Expanding the Governance Construct: Functions and Contributions of 
Nonprofit Advisory Groups, 27 Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Q. 421, 421 (1998) (arguing 
that advisory groups are a critical instrument of governance for many nonprofits because such 
groups “link nonprofits to key stakeholder groups in the environment . . . strengthen ties of coopera-
tion and shared purpose with other community actors . . . supplement governance activities carried 
out by non profit boards of directors . . . establish new ties to various elites . . . [and] others connect 
nonprofits to grassroots community constituencies”). See generally Lisa A. Runquist, The ABCs 
of Nonprofits 21–22 (2005) (recommending increased use of advisory boards).  
 184. Miller, supra note 23, at 447. 
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reforms that facilitate this process of building accountability may be wel-
come.185  
This is not to say that the Sarbanes-Oxley-like reforms entirely miss the 
normative mark.186 The imposition of independent audit committees, for ex-
ample, may go a long way toward fostering improved stakeholder-style 
board governance. As noted above, a key issue confronting nonprofit board 
performance revolves around poorly informed directors and their overly 
supine attitudes toward management.187 Further, empirical data indicates that 
large board size, a ubiquitous phenomenon in nonprofits, is associated with 
lower levels of formal monitoring by the board.188 In the for-profit arena, 
however, “larger boards are not as susceptible to managerial domination as 
their smaller counterpart . . . . [T]hese boards will be more actively involved 
in monitoring and evaluating CEO and company performance, normally 
through specialized committees.”189 Perhaps the imposition of small, special-
ized, and independent audit committees and executive committees will bring 
similar results in the nonprofit context. The data suggests that more active 
nonprofit board oversight can prevent the harm that managerial malfeasance 
can inflict on constituents, communities, and overall organizational reputa-
tion.190 Finally, structural reforms such as the imposition of audit committees 
lay the groundwork for ethical corporate governance, not just for a particular 
metric that is measured in a disclosure form but for a wide array of issues 
that may come before the board.191  
Of course, no reform scheme is perfect. Unlike Sarbanes-Oxley, the 
nonprofit reforms do not require that audit committees have financial ex-
perts as members.192 This may come as a mixed blessing. On the one hand, 
nonprofit accounting practices are substantially different from those em-
ployed by for-profit firms and may well leave audit committee members, 
                                                                                                                      
 185. Cf. H.B. 1408, 2004 Leg., 2004 Sess. (N.H. 2004) (“Every health care charitable trust 
shall . . . conduct a community needs assessment to assist in determining the activities to be in-
cluded in its community benefits plan . . . . [which shall] identif[y] and prioritiz[e] . . . community 
needs that the health care charitable trust can address directly, or in collaboration with others . . . .”). 
 186. See Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1326. 
 187. See supra notes 36, 41 and accompanying text. 
 188. O’Regan & Oster, supra note 23, at 216–19. 
 189. S.A. Zahra & J.A. Pearce, Boards of Directors and Corporate Financial Performance: A 
Review and Integrative Model, 15 J. Mgmt. 291, 309 (1989).  
 190. See Margaret Gibelman et al., The Credibility of Nonprofit Boards: A View from the 
1990s and Beyond, 21 Admin. Soc. Work 21 (1997) (reviewing the boards’ oversight role of five 
large nonprofit organizations). 
 191. See Josef Wieland, The Ethics of Governance, 11 Bus. Ethics Q. 73 (2001) (arguing that 
the fostering of ethical corporate behavior must start with formal corporate structure). 
 192. Compare Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 407, Pub. L. No. 107–204, 116 Stat. 745 (codi-
fied at 15 U.S.C. § 7265(a) (Supp. III 2003)) and 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(h) (2006), with Cal. Bus. & 
Prof. Code § 17510.5 (West Supp. 2006), S.B. 4836-B, 2004 Leg., 227th Sess. (N.Y. 2003), and 
Mass. A.G. Proposal, supra note 10. 
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even those who are veteran businesspeople, in the dark.193 This opacity could 
thwart any attempt at meaningful board oversight of financial matters. But 
on the other hand, recruiting dedicated nonprofit directors is already a diffi-
cult enough task without the added requirement of finding a nonprofit 
director with substantive knowledge of nonprofit accountancy.194 Thus, the 
requirement that nonprofits (at least those with substantial resources) obtain 
professional audits makes sense from the stakeholder perspective. Given the 
specialized nature of nonprofit accounting, an audit requirement will force 
nonprofit boards into obtaining a clear understanding of their organization’s 
financial health. All this is to show that, by adopting a stakeholder norma-
tive framework, reformers of the nonprofit sector will more likely adopt 
legislation that will positively change nonprofit board governance. 
Conclusion 
An increased appreciation of the problems of nonprofit board govern-
ance, which the Sarbanes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms embody, is a positive 
step away from the traditional neglect of the nonprofit community by public 
and private supervisory institutions. Indeed, as the nonprofit sector contin-
ues to grow, issues of board governance will become more pressing, thus 
increasing the need for effective oversight institutions. Such efforts, how-
ever, should be based upon a normative perspective that is apropos to the 
nonprofit sector instead of a knee-jerk application of for-profit regulatory 
structures to the nonprofit sector. Unfortunately, the bulk of the recent Sar-
banes-Oxley-like nonprofit reforms do not adopt this philosophy. 
 
                                                                                                                      
 193. See generally, Martha L. Benson et al., Coping With NPO Standards—It’s Not Difficult, 
J. Acct., Sept. 1998, at 67 (discussing the impact of new rules governing the accounting of contri-
butions). 
 194. See generally Szymanski, supra note 32, at 1316 (“Commentators have frequently de-
scribed the difficulty many nonprofits encounter when searching for qualified directors and board 
members.”). The California act does allow for nondirectors to serve on the audit committee; induc-
ing experts in nonprofit accountancy to serve may be less demanding as they need only serve in this 
one capacity. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12586(e)(2) (West 2005).  
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